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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the influence of institutional ownership and audit committees corporate 
risk disclosures. Focusing on analysing firms’ risk disclosures make in their 2009 annual 
reports, our sample constitutes a sample of 66 Australian listed firms. We divide institutional 
shareholders into dedicated-type institutional block shareholders and transient-type 
institutional block shareholders. We find that while there is no significant relationship between 
dedicated-type institutional block shareholders and risk disclosure, there is a positive 
relationship between transient-type institutional block shareholders and risk disclosures. Our 
result is consistent with a principal that wields limited monitoring resources while achieving 
high resource dependency over management. We also find a significant and positive relationship 
between audit committee independence and risk disclosures, showing the positive role played by 
audit committee in improving the information transparency and reducing information 
asymmetry in capital market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information on risk can help to determine the risk profile of a company, the accuracy of security price 
forecasts, the estimation of market value and the probability of corporate failure (Lang and Lundholm, 
1996; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). This justifies 
why risk disclosure and risk management practices have attracted increased attention following the major 
accounting scandals and corporate collapses of the early 2000’s (Power, 2004) and the global financial 
crisis of 2008-9 (Kirkpatrick, 2009). However, despite the perceived importance of risk information to 
investors in making equity and debt investment decisions, empirical studies continue to find that risk 
information disclosed in corporate annual reports remains inadequate (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, 2008; 
Perignon and Smith, 2010). In Australia, risk disclosure in annual reports is regulated by the corporate 
governance guidelines of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), and the accounting standard AASB 7 
Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure. The former recommends “timely and balanced 
disclosure with commentary information” on financial results to enhance the “clarity and balance of 
reporting”, while the latter requires disclosure in financial statements of information about the nature of 
underlying financial instruments and associated risks. Inadequacies in corporate risk disclosure practices 
under these regulations have been identified in prior Australian studies. Chalmers and Godfrey (2000) 
found a high degree of non-compliance in respect to derivative financial instrument disclosures mandated 
under AASB 1033 (the standard preceding AASB 7). Those companies complying with disclosure 
requirements of AASB 1033 tended to be “too brief, vague or general in nature (Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2000, p.98). More recently Taylor et al. (2010, p.60) found “a great diversity of disclosure of financial 
risk information” by Australian listed companies in the mining industry. While mandatory financial risk 
management information included a description of the extent of currency, price, credit and interest rate 
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risk, far less information was given about the financial assets exposed to these risks. Taylor et al. (2010) 
further identified a low sample mean for the extent of information relating to matters such as internal 
controls used to mitigate financial instrument risk, financial risk sensitivity analysis and liquidity risk and 
its management. 
 
The aims of this study are first, to extend risk disclosure research by identifying the pattern of risk 
disclosures in annual reports of Australian listed companies in the sub-categories of operational risk, 
financial risk and environmental risk information, distinguishing between risk performance and risk 
management, and between past/future and positive/negative orientations in the information. As the 
corporate reporting of a complex topic like risk management and performance is inherently problematic, 
especially for narrative disclosures, research into the factors that drive risk disclosure decisions by 
corporate managements can provide a way forward in seeking to better understand how to enhance the 
corporate practice of risk reporting (Forker, 1992; McMullen, 1996; Ho and Wong, 2001; Barako et al., 
2006). Some studies have addressed the possible drivers of risk disclosure. Solomon et al. (2000) and 
Taylor et al. (2008) test various corporate governance characteristics as drivers of risk disclosures. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) and Abraham and Cox (2007) consider the influence of institutional investors as 
drivers of risk disclosures. However, evidence remains limited on how different types of institutional 
investors, as pressure groups, might drive disclosure decisions by management about different dimensions 
and attributes of risk management and performance. The second aim of this study, therefore, is to model 
and test the relationships between different forms of institutional investors and different dimensions of 
risk disclosure by listed companies. Corporate governance mechanisms concerned with the board that 
have been investigated as drivers of risk disclosure. The two key roles of audit committees of boards are 
to ensure that risks are managed and internal controls exist to guard against risks, and corporate reports to 
shareholders are vetted for the integrity of financial and other shareholder-relevant disclosures. Taylor et 
al. (2008) is the only study to assess the relationship between the structure of the audit committee and 
corporate risk disclosure. They model audit committee membership within a composite corporate 
governance score, rather than a separate independent variable. Thus, no study has tested the association 
between the composition of an audit committee and risk disclosures. The third aim of this study is to 
model and test the relationship between the extent of independence and the level of financial expertise of 
audit committee members and different dimensions of risk disclosure of listed companies. 
 
Using a sample of 66 Australian listed companies, risk disclosures made in 2009 annual reports are 
analysed. Findings reveal that there no significant relationships between dedicated-type institutional block 
shareholders and risk disclosure, which it is argued is consistent with a proprietary information 
perspective. A positive relationship however is found between transient-type institutional block 
shareholders and risk disclosures. This result is consistent with a principal that wields limited monitoring 
resources while achieving high resource dependency over management. Significant positive relationships 
are found between audit committee independence and risk disclosures. 
 
This study makes several contributions to risk disclosure literature. First, this study describes patterns of 
risk disclosure practices, distinguishing those information items with attributes deemed to be less relevant 
to investors’ decision making from those deemed more relevant. Second, this study sheds light on the 
effects of pressures on management from institutional investors on the various patterns of risk disclosure 
practices. With institutional investors are further categorized into transient investors, quasi-indexer 
investors and dedicated investors, measuring by portfolio diversification, portfolio turnover and trading 
sensitivity, the findings of this study show a clearer picture of the financial characteristics of the 
institutional investor group which has the most significant impact on corporate risk disclosures. Third, 
this study explores the association between one of the most important corporate governance mechanism - 
audit committee and risk disclosures, demonstrating the important role could be played by corporate 
governance mechanism in improving risk management and preventing corporate collapses. In addition, 
the findings of this study have regulatory and practical implications. For regulators, our finding show the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism in improving corporate risk management in Australia. 
For domestic investors and financial analysts, our findings inform them the risk disclosure pattern in 
Australia and influential corporate factors of risk disclosures. This will assist investors and financial 
analysts to assess companies’ business risks and companies’ abilities of risk management.  
 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the literature reviews and hypothesis 
development. Section 3 describes the research design and methodology used. Sections 4 comprises of the 
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main results and interpretation of those results. Section 5 summarizes findings and makes conclusion 
remarks. 
 
2. Literature background and hypotheses 
 
There is a growing body of corporate disclosure literature concerned with information on risk. One strand 
has concentrated on the specific aspect of disclosure of financial risk in relation to financial instruments 
(e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Another strand involves examining risk 
disclosure from a broad perspective and disaggregating the construct into several categories (e.g., Collins 
et al., 1993; Solomon, 2000). In this literature, the determinants of risk disclosure have been considered 
on a non-theoretical basis of firm size and industry. More recently, Abraham and Cox (2007) invoke 
agency theory to draw together ownership structure and governance mechanisms as determinants of the 
extent of risk disclosure. As explained by Abraham and Cox (2007, p. 231), “ownership and governance 
factors may play a vital role in firms’ risk reporting because … (first) large investors (as principals) can 
be expected to demand a broad range of potentially relevant risk information that management might 
otherwise choose to withhold (and second) … directors (as agents) are expected to improve accountability 
and disclosure”. As further argued by Abraham and Cox (2007, p. 231), “the relationship between risk 
disclosure and corporate ownership and governance is of interest to regulators because (large) 
institutional owners and independent directors are expected to reduce agency problems, and thus lessen 
the need for regulatory intervention in corporate reporting.”  
 
This study extends the application of Abraham and Cox’s (2007) perspective. The behavior of the 
principal is addressed in terms of the influence of large institutional shareholders on risk disclosure with 
particular focus on the different motives of dedicated institutional investors compared to transient 
institutional investors. The behavior of the agent is addressed as the influence of the Audit Committee on 
risk disclosure with focus on the independence and expertise of members of this committee. 
 
2.1. Institutional investors and risk disclosure 
 
Prior studies assert that institutional investors are expected to mitigate information asymmetry by 
performing a monitoring role through close relations with the management of corporations (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Healy et al., 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Koh, 2003; Gray et al., 2009). As one of the 
key corporate mechanisms, institutional investors are expected to curb management from withdrawing 
risk information. Studies by Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) and Taylor et al. (2008) suggest that enhanced 
financial risk information could be a result of institutional investors’ pressure which performs as a 
substitute for effective corporate governance. In contrast, other studies have not found evidence to 
support this agency perspective on the role of institutional shareholders. Bushee and Noe (2000) do not 
find a relationship between institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon and the extent of 
investee companies’ risk disclosure in annual reports. Solomon et al.’s (2000) finding is consistent with 
this phenomenon in showing that institutional investors hold a moderate view toward the need of risk 
disclosure. It can be reasoned that institutions with long-term investment horizon are concerned with the 
fact that the release of proprietary information may affect long term competitiveness, therefore preferring 
private risk communication (Solomon et al., 2000). Empirical implications from Abraham and Cox’s 
(2007) study substantiate the conjecture that long-term institutional investors prefer risk information to be 
disclosed privately.  
 
Meanwhile, Healy et al. (1999) and Bushee and Noe (2000) indicate that closer monitoring by transient 
institutional investors’ reduces information asymmetry and enhances the level of corporate transparency. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) categorize institutional investors into transient institutional investors (TransInst), 
quasi-indexer institutions (QuasiInst), and dedicated institutions (DedicInst), yielding the result that 
TransInst is positively related to the level of corporate disclosure, but DedicInst ownership is not 
associated with the degree of corporate disclosure. 
 
Low portfolio turnover and large stable holdings in a select number of firms are the characteristics of 
DedicInsts. This indicates long term investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000), who have ample resources and 
distinguished capabilities to access private risk information, hence whose interest would be in line with 
managers but not other shareholders. This would satisfy the assumption under the proprietary cost 
hypothesis (Verrecchia, 1983) where conflict of interest hardly exists between corporate managers and 
DedicInst investment managers. Fama and Jensen (1983) support the notion that in firms with more 
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concentrated ownership, the possibility of conflicts between principal and agent is smaller. This 
association has also been examined by a large body of research (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Healy 
et al., 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Ho and Wong, 2001). The alignment of interests means that 
DedicInst is less likely to impose additional pressure on the firms to disclose risk information. To 
maintain their investment competitiveness, it can be postulated that DedicInsts do not hold a positive 
view toward risk information disclosed via public vehicles. Hence the alternate hypothesis is: 
H1A: There is negative relationship between the proportion of DedicInst ownership in a company and the 
extent of negative information, future information and total information about risk reported in the annual 
report of that company.  
 
Compared to a DedicInst, a QuasiInst has a low level of portfolio turnover, indicating that a QuasiInst is 
still capable of obtaining private risk information. However, Bushee and Noe (2000) suggest that since a 
QuasiInst has diversified investment portfolios, it is costly to acquire private risk information from each 
investee company. Therefore, a QuasiInst would prefer risk information publicly disclosed in annual 
reports. 
 
Highly frequent trading activities and diversified portfolios are the characteristics of a TransInst, 
indicating short-term investors (Bushee and Noe, 2000). The implication is that TransInsts do not have a 
steady long-term relationship with investee companies. Consequently, a TransInst has limited resources 
and capabilities to access private risk information. Thus, a TransInst has to highly rely on public risk 
reporting. As a large shareholder, TransInsts are in a position to extract management appeasement in good 
corporate governance, including relevant transparency. Therefore, it can be hypothesized by: 
H1B: The proportion of both TransInst and QuasiInst ownership is positively related to the extent of 
negative information, future information and total information about risk reported in the annual report.  
 
2.2. Audit committees and risk disclosure 
 
The audit committee of board usually has a role of overseeing the quality of reported information in 
financial statements. The ASX principles are based on the view that quality corporate governance 
influences the extent of company risk disclosure (ASX, 2006). An audit committee is considered the pre-
eminent corporate governance mechanism in the financial reporting process (Blue Ribbon Committee, 
1999; Smith Committee, 2003; COSO ERM framework, 2004). This has been supported by literature 
suggesting that audit committees have the most direct responsibility in overseeing financial reporting (Xie 
et al., 2003; Hoitash et al., 2009). Collier (1993) contends that an audit committee serves the purpose of 
ensuring the quality of financial accounting and control system. McMullen (1996), and Peasnell et al. 
(2001) further find that an audit committee can effectively improve the reliability of financial reporting. 
In line with these studies, Ho and Wong (2001) and Barako et al. (2006) find the presence of an audit 
committee positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure. In Australia, the ASX top 500 
companies are required to have an audit committee (CLERP 9).  
 
The existence of an audit committee, however, does not guarantee effective monitoring. Therefore the 
presence of a competent audit committee has been emphasized as the vital corporate governance 
mechanism in watching over financial reporting (BRC, 1999; Smith Committee, 2003; COSO ERM 
framework, 2004). This view is supported by findings that a competent audit committee (in terms of 
having the characteristics of financial expertise and independence) is associated with better corporate 
disclosure (Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Hoitash et al., 2009). Independence ratio of 
audit committee members, financial expertise, committee size and the frequency of the committee 
meetings have been highlighted in the BRC (1999) as the key characteristics of a competent audit 
committee. To enhance financial reporting in Australia, ‘Best Practice’ (2006) subsequently requires ASX 
top 500 companies to have independent audit committees with only non-executive directors, and also 
indicates the importance of financially expert and diligent members in audit committees. Therefore, the 
current study tests the relationship between the presence of a competent audit committee and the extent of 
risk information disclosed in annual reports. 
 
Existing literature highlights the positive relationship between financial reporting and audit committee 
members’ financial expertise (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Mangena and Pike, 2005; Magena and 
Tauringana, 2007; Hoitash et al., 2009), and the positive relationship between the extent of corporate 
disclosure and audit committee members independence ratio (McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; 
Beasley, 1996; Abbott and Parker, 2000; Magena and Tauringana, 2007). It can be seen that an audit 
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committee’s oversight role can be strengthened by having independent directors with financial expertise. 
Therefore the current study measures audit committee competency by looking at audit committee 
members’ independence ratio and their financial expertise. As a result, it can be hypothesized that: 
H2A: The independence of an audit committee is positively related to the extent of negative information, 
future information and total information about risk reported in the annual report. 
H2B: The financial expertise of an audit committee is positively related to the extent of negative 
information, future information and total information about risk reported in the annual report. 
 
3. Research methodology 
 
3.1 Selection of Sample 
 
The hypotheses are tested using a sample from Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Top 201 to Top 350 
companies as at financial year ended in 2009. This range is viewed as the mid-size bracket of listed 
companies. Companies are excluded from the sample for the following reasons: 1). financial industry 
companies (such as banks, financial institutions, insurance and superannuation) and mining industry 
companies as these companies have different reporting requirements and balance sheet structures. 2). 
foreign firms listed on the ASX that follow much of the risk reporting approach of their parent company 
which faces more stringent requirements in its home jurisdiction than ASX requirements. 3). Companies 
that had no institutional investors in the top 20 shareholders. 66 companies were selected as the sample. 
The selection of companies below the ASX Top 200 is justified on the basis of obtaining a sufficient 
variation in the data for audit committees. The ASX corporate governance code makes it mandatory for 
the Top 200 listed companies to have an audit committee with 100% non-executive directors (i.e., all are 
to be independent directors), whereas the ASX highly recommends, but does not mandate, this for listed 
companies in the Top 201 to 500.  
 
Despite rapid technological innovation paving the way for alternate vehicles to be employed as a means 
of delivering information to users for decision making (Healy and Palepu, 2001), annual reports are still 
considered to be the most influential means for companies to communicate risk information to their users 
(Beattie et al., 2002; Linsley and Shrives, 2005). Risk disclosures are hand-collected from 2009 annual 
reports. Other financial and governance data for explanatory variables are obtained through Compustat - 
SandP Research insight, and DatAnalytics databases. As a result of lack of quarterly data for the 
independent variable, institutional investors, yearly institutional data is employed in this study.  
 
3.2 Content Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is a quantity measure of risk information disclosed in annual reports. For the 
purpose of this study, content analysis is performed to identify the extent of risk disclosures. It is a 
method widely used in empirical studies on corporate risk disclosure (Linsley and Shrive, 2005; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007). Content analysis is a rich source of data as it can establish relationships that are 
otherwise difficult to be revealed and replicate (Linsley and Shrives, 2006) and it can be utilized when 
large amounts of qualitative data (in the form of text items) needs to be quantified (Holsti, 1969).  
 
3.3 Definitions of Variables 
 
The definition of risk helps in aggregating the amount of risk performance information and the amount of 
risk management information disclosed in annual reports for the subsequent analyses. For this study, the 
definition of risk performance is referred to Linsley and Shrives’ (2006) definition: “If the reader is 
informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has 
already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the company in the future or of the management 
of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, threat or exposure”. The definition of risk management 
for this study is adopted from the publication by COSO ERM – Integrated Framework (2004), which 
states: “…a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied 
in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives”. 
 
This study further classifies risk into functional types. Collier (2009) classifies risk into operational risk, 
financial risk, environmental risk, and reputation risk. As reputation risk refers to risk caused by failing to 
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address some other risk, it is less viable to show it in the annual report. Therefore, only three functional 
types of risk will be analyzed in this study: environmental risk, financial risk and operational risk. First, 
the meaning of environmental risk is derived from Doff’s (2008) definition of business risk as “the risk of 
financial loss due to changes in the competitive environment or the extent to which the organization could 
timely adapt to these changes”. This definition of business risk is quite close to the meaning of 
environmental risk put forward by Collier (2009). Second, operating risk is defined by the Basel 
Committee as "the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems 
or from external events". The approach taken in this study is to separate risk that occurred inside and 
outside of an organization. Risk resulting from external events has been included in environmental risk. 
Therefore, operational risk in this study only refers to the first half in the Basel definition. This is also 
consistent with the meaning in Collier’s (2009) operational risk. Third, financial risk relates to the 
financial operation of a business, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, currency risk, interest risk and cash 
flow risk (AASB, 1999, 2004a). Thus, for the purpose of this study, operational risk relates to processes, 
people and systems; financial risk relates to credit, liquidity, currency, interest and cash flow; 
environmental risk relates to competition, industry, economic, political, legal and regulatory change. 
 
Bushee’s (1998) study is replicated to classify institutional investors into three types, based on data about 
institutional shareholders that identifies the level of their portfolio diversification, the degree of portfolio 
turnover, and institutions’ trading sensitivity. After conducting factor analysis, three common factors 
were produced in Bushee’s (1998) study to distinguish between types of institutional shareholders. These 
are referred to as the BLOCK factor (measuring the average size of an institution’s company shareholding 
in its portfolio of investments); the PTURN factor (measuring the degree of portfolio turnover); and the 
MOMEN factor (measuring the trading sensitivity to current earning news). 
 
Table 1 provides definitions of the three factors used to classify institutional investors into 3 groups. Due 
to the lack of data regarding companies’ full list of institutional shareholders, this study only examines 
top 20 shareholders of the selected firms, of which individual shareholders are excluded. After obtaining 
the results for each factor, institutions who invested in the sampled companies only in year 2008 but not 
in year 2009 are dropped, because this study analyzes annual reports in the year ended 2009. The 
categorization conceived by Bushee (1998) suggests that institutions with high (low) BLOCK scores will 
have their portfolios characterized by larger (smaller) average investments in their chosen portfolio firms. 
 
Table 1. Institutional Investor Characteristics 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Bushee (1998) 
 
Note: The characteristics are calculated at the end of each financial year for institutions in top 20 shareholders from 
annual reports. The yearly values are all the yearly available for the financial year to get end of the year values of 
each characteristic for each institution. 
 
Due to more (less) frequent trade, institutions with high (low) PTURN scores are less (more) likely to 
have a long-term investment commitment to any given firm in their portfolio. Generally, traders who tend 
to increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks with positive (negative) current news will have high 
MOMEN scores. Likewise, traders who increase (decrease) their holdings with negative (positive) current 
earning news score lower on the MOMEN.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the criteria used by Bushee (1998) to arrive at the three types of institutional 
investors. For the purpose of this study, the indicator variable for each group (TransInst, QuasiInst and 
Factor Definition 
BLOCK (Average percentage holding) (∑Wk,2009PHk,2009)/∑Wk,2009 
PTURN (Portfolio turnover) ∑∣∆Wk,2009∣/(∑Wk,2009+∑Wk,2008) 
MOMEN (Trading sensitivity to current news) (∑∆Wk,2009RWEk,2009)/∑∣∆Wk,2009∣ 
Wk, 2009: portfolio weight (shares held times stock price) in firm k at end of 2009. 
∆Wk,2009 = Wk, 2009 – Wk, 2008  
PHk, 2009: percentage of total shares in firm k held by institution at end of 2009. 
RWEk, 2009: stock price sensitivity to earning announcements acquired by event study is used as a proxy 
for seasonal random walk in year 2009. 
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DedicInst) is coded as 1 if the shareholding is dominated by this type of institutional investors; otherwise 
0. Bushee (1998) suggests that this approach will avoid the problem of high correlation between the three 
groups in percentage ownership.  
 
Table 2. Classification rules of institutional investors 
 
Type BLOCK PTURN MOMEN 
Transient  Relatively Small High High 
Quasi-indexer  Small  Low Low 
Dedicated  High (high concentration) Low Nearly 0 
 
TransInsts are those institutions who have highly diversified investments (low BLOCK), trade frequently 
(high PTURN) and increase their share ownership responding to positive earnings announcements; 
QuasiInsts are those institutions with large, diversified portfolios and relatively high turnover but add to 
their shareholdings if there are negative earnings announcements; DedicInsts refers to institutions which 
hold highly concentrated and stable portfolios, and show little sensitivity to earnings announcements 
(Bushee and Noe, 2000).  
 
Due to the difficulty of directly capturing random walk change in earnings per share of firms, stock price 
sensitivity to earning announcements is used as a proxy for random walk change, so as to obtain trading 
sensitivity to current news. Stock price sensitivity to earning announcements data is acquired by 
employing an event study, measured using the firm specific abnormal returns around an earnings 
announcement. The objective of an event study is to examine the stock market’s response to events often 
related to information releases of the stock market. According to the semi-strong form of efficient market 
hypothesis, the market price fully reflects all publicly available information (Fama 1970; Jensen 1978; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Therefore, an unanticipated event linked with an abnormal stock return 
will be observed to have information content. The event study methodology is relatively easy to 
implement due to the nature of the necessary data (being publicly traded firms’ name, stock prices, event 
dates and trading volumes). 
 
The second determinant of potential pressure placed on management to voluntarily disclose the 
company’s risk-related information is the competency of the company’s audit committee. Competency is 
deemed to entail both the independence and financial expertise of members. First, the committee’s 
independence ratio (independent members to total members committee) can be attained by information 
directly self-reported on audit committee members in 2009 annual reports of the sample companies. 
Second, audit committee’s financial expertise is measured in terms of whether committee members in 
2009 held relevant qualifications, and/or had substantial financial experience.  
 
Based on the argument of agency theory, investors can price protect themselves from agency costs, giving 
manager incentives to disclose more risk related information. Therefore the bigger the firm is, the higher 
the price the investors could afford in monitoring the agent’s opportunistic behavior. Previous studies 
show a positive association exists between companies’ size and the quantity of risk disclosure (Buzby, 
1975; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Abraham and Cox, 2007). Thus, 
the model in this study includes the control variable of corporate size by using market capitalization.  
 
4. Results  
 
4.1 The Poisson Model and Correlation Analysis 
 
In this study, Poisson models are employed in regressing institutional ownership and audit committee 
competency on risk information disclosures. Poisson regression models have been extensively applied as 
a means of analyzing data that contains a count of item occurrences. For the purpose of this research, the 
Poisson model is chosen over the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for several reasons. 
The dependent variable in question for this study is measured as a count of appearances of relevant 
sentences on risk disclosure. This count variable is positive or zero by nature as an event can only occur 
or not occur, and cannot occur a negative number of times. When count mean is relatively low (less than 
10), OLS regression produces undesirable errors (Gardner et al., 1995). If the variance of the predictor 
variable is small, as is the case when the number of times of risk disclosure has a small range, the 
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regression coefficient for that predictor becomes very unstable and large standard errors would occur 
(Cohen et al., 2003). Count variables often also display a conditional variance that increases with the 
value of the predictor, thereby violating the assumption under OLS that errors have constant variance 
(homoscedasticity). Distributions of count variables also tend to be positively skewed and kurtotic with 
many low count observations and no negative observations. Under these conditions OLS regression tends 
to produce undesirable results such as biased significance tests and standard errors (Gardner et al., 1995; 
Long, 1997). 
 
Company annual reports, while still the best vehicle to inform stakeholders of risk, cannot possibly be 
expected to mention each type of risk separately under the dependent variable subcategories. In fact, most 
annual reports are consistently designed not to mention certain types of risk at all, especially in the 
subcategories of future and negative risk. This means that there is an unusually large amount of 0s 
included in the sample. When there are increased frequencies of 0s, this leads to a right skewing of the 
Poisson distribution. In order to appropriately include these data in the sample, the zero inflated Poisson 
model is used for future and negative risk subcategories (Greene, 1994; Hall and Zhengang, 2004; Long, 
1997). All other categories in this study are analyzed using the standard Poisson regression model. 
 
Pearson correlations in Table 3 show QuasiInst the most correlated independent variable to other 
independent variables. It is highly inversely correlated with DedicInst and positively correlated with 
ACIndep and ACExpert. Therefore, QuasiInsts will be eliminated, and only DedicInsts and TransInsts 
retained in the subsequent regression analysis in order to avoid a multicollinearity problem and meet the 
assumption under the Poisson model that explanatory variables are independent from each other.  
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlations 
 
 ACIndep  ACFinExp TransInst DedicInst QuasiInst ExtAudit 
ACFinExp .307
*
      
 TransInst -.003 -.049     
 DedicInst -.240 -.281
*
 -.380
*
    
 QuasiInst .255
*
 .326
**
 -.216 -.821
**
   
 ExtAudit .104 .114 -.101 .168 -.115  
 MktCap .122 -.042 -.191 .272
*
 -.169 .157 
**
,
* 
denotes significant correlation at <0.01 and <0.05 levels respectively, for two-tailed tests. 
Variable definitions: 
ACFinExp = audit committee members' financial expertise, measured by being with either 
an accounting related qualification or extensive financial experience 
ACIndep = audit committee members' independence ratio 
TransInst = firms with transient institutional ownership in year 2009 
DedicInst = firms with dedicated institutional ownership in year 2009 
QuasiInst = firms with quasi-indexer institutional ownership in year 2009 
ExtAudit = firms with Big 4 auditors in year 2009 
MktCap = Square root of market capitalization of the selected firms in year 2009  
 
The resultant Poisson regression model and variable notations are as follows: 
 
                                                              
                 
(1) 
 
Interpretation of the Poisson model should be used with caution, as it is not an ordinary linear model. 
Equivalent to the above model, the multiplicative model is: 
 
                                                                    (2) 
 
Therefore, the coefficients are α, β1, β2, β3, β4 and β5. The interpretation is: 1 unit increase in an 
independent variable, given other variables are constant, results in the estimated dependent variable 
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increasing by e^coefficient if the coefficient is positive; and decreasing by e^coefficient times if the 
coefficient is negative. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics on the Extent of Risk Disclosure 
 
Consistent with the method and definitions in counting the number of risk disclosures, descriptive details 
of risk information is represented by Table 4. Studies done by Linsley and Shrives (2006), and Abraham 
and Cox (2007) in UK coded 6168 risk disclosure sentences and 8842 pieces of risk information (words 
out of sentences) respectively, whereas only 1836 risk reporting sentences have been coded in the current 
study. Different risk disclosure requirements are not the major reason leading to such difference in the 
aggregate amount of risk information disclosure, as regulatory requirements in the UK are quite minimal 
as in Australia.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on Risk Disclosure (count of number of sentences in Annual Reports) 
 
  Min Max Mean SD Sum  % 
Operational Risk         521 28.38% 
Risk Management            
Past   0 10 3.08 2.513 203   
Future   0 5 1.18 1.626 78   
Neg   0 4 0.27 0.775 18 0.98% 
Risk Performance            
Past   0 7 2.05 2.019 135   
Future   0 7 1.59 1.881 105   
Neg   0 1 0.02 0.123 1 0.05% 
Financial Risk        963 52.45% 
Risk Management           
Past   0 15 6.52 3.278 430   
Future   0 3 0.3 0.744 20   
Neg   0 7 0.41 1.163 27  1.47% 
Risk Performance            
Past   0 15 5.53 2.758 365   
Future   0 12 2.24 2.24 148   
Neg   0 0 0 0 0  0 
Environmental Risk         352 19.17% 
Risk Management            
Past   0 11 3.45 2.463 228   
Future   0 7 0.68 1.192 45   
Neg   0 6 1.8 1.712 119  6.48% 
Risk Performance            
Past   0 10 0.76 1.53 50   
Future   0 4 0.44 0.994 29   
Neg   0 0 0 0 0  0 
Total performance 3 33 12.62 4.867 832 45.32% 
Neg 0 1 0.02 0.123 1 0.05% 
Total management 4 30 17.45 5.978 1004 54.68% 
Neg 0 10 2.48 2.329 164 8.93% 
Future         425 23.15% 
Operational Future 0 10 2.77 2.636 183   
Financial Future 0 12 2.55 2.241 168   
Environmental Future 0 7 1.12 1.741 74   
Total risks disclosed         1836 100%  
 
The large differences can be attributed to two major reasons: the sample selected in the present study is 
from ASX top 201 to top 350, whilst the sample selected in the UK study is from FTSE 100 Index. As 
several studies contend that there is a positive association between companies’ size and the quantity of 
risk disclosure (Buzby, 1975; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007), it is 
reasonable that studies in UK coded more risk information. The inconsistent amount of disclosures also 
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results from different coding rules applied. Only when the report acknowledged that a risk existed, exists, 
or will exist did the coder actually code it in this study.  
 
Results in Table 4 are first addressed in relation to disclosures of positive versus negative information. 
Table 4 reveals that total risk management information does not exceedingly out number total risk 
performance information, but negative risk does. 8.93% negative risk management information was coded 
whereas only 0.05% negative risk performance information was coded. Moreover, negative 
environmental risk information contributes approximately three quarters of total negative risk 
management information. More than 90% of risk disclosures are positive information, which portrays the 
managers and companies in question in a much more favorable light. By displaying this ‘good news’, 
managers seek to introduce a potential cascade of events that could ultimately act in line with their own 
self-interest. It appears that managers tend to view signaling theory as working in the realm of positive 
risk information. However, to establish credibility in capital markets, a company should ‘signal’ both 
positive and negative information to the prospective market. In the absence of any relevant disclosures or 
any negative disclosures, investors are likely to impute a discount on the value of the firm according to 
signaling theory. The results showing 90% of risk disclosures as positive information suggest that 
signaling theory is not being widely applied in terms of negative risk-related information.  
 
Further evaluation of the negative risk disclosures in Table 4 shows that virtually no negative risks have 
been coded except environmental. It is apparent that management is less willingly to talk about the 
negative types of risks, unless the risks are completely out of their control, such as negative 
environmental risk. Seldom will management publicly report about negative risk that they have some 
control over, such as negative financial and operational risks. This explains why negative environmental 
risk information is disclosed far beyond the other two. These findings are consistent with a large stream 
of literature (Rayner, 1992; Beck, 1998; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Mobus, 2005) on behavioral aspects 
of managerial decision making which argues that individuals like to take credit for the good things that 
occur, and like to assume that they have no control over the bad things that happen.  Rayner (1992) 
further asserts that technological advance increases the propensity of management to avoid blame, due to 
the fact that technology speeds up the dissemination of information and therefore the consequences 
associated with ‘bad events’.  
 
Turning to the three types of risk, Table 4 reveals that the amount of financial risk information disclosed 
stands out as 52.45% of total risk disclosures compared to 28.38% for operational risk and 19.17% for 
environmental risk. There are two possible reasons for the higher financial risk disclosure. First, financial 
risks are easier to identify and objectively measure than broader and more complex risks that 
organizations face in the operational and environmental risk categories. Second, financial risks disclosure 
is required by AASB 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures, whereas environmental risks and operational 
risks are not mandatorily required to be disclosed in Australia. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003), and 
Akhigbe et al. (2008) argue that the mandatory nature of the regulatory disclosure provisions is likely to 
explain the emphasis found in risk disclosures. Taylor et al. (2010) suggest that the introduction of 
AASB139 and IFRS in Australia may motivate management for better corporate transparency. This 
observation also supports the research done by Mobus (2005) that mandatory accounting disclosures play 
a role in making financial reporting a means of conveying reliable information rather than mere 
information.  
 
Also in Table 4 are comparisons of past and future information. Future risk information only contributes 
less than a quarter (23.15%) of total amount of disclosures. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that litigation 
provides a means of mitigating information asymmetry problems, but it would also reduce managers’ 
incentive to disclose information, in particular, forward looking information. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis of Determinants of Risk Disclosure 
 
Table 5 represents Poisson regression results on factors affecting the extent of risk information disclosed 
in annual reports of the sampled mid-size listed companies in Australia in 2009. As risk disclosures are 
grouped into different categories, the dependent variables tested include: the extent of total risk 
information disclosed; the extent of total operational /financial/environmental/ performance/ management 
risk information; the extent of negative and future operational/financial/ environmental/performance/ 
management risk information. 
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Table 5. Poisson regression results under different categories of risk disclosures
1
 
 
Variable3 Intercept ACIndep ACFinExp DedicInst TransInst MktCap prob>χ2 b 
RDType2        
TOTALRD 3.1080 0.2116*** 0.0648 -0.0644 0.1547* 0.0000 0.0009 
 22.3773 1.2356 1.0669 0.9376 1.1673 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0072) (0.4492) (0.2551) (0.0659) (0.8527)  
TotOperRD 3.2673 0.3448** -0.0066 -0.1535 0.2737* -0.0001*** 0.0000 
 26.2411 1.4117 0.9935 0.8577 1.3148 0.9999  
 (0.0000) (0.0221) (0.9680) (0.1507) (0.0523) (0.0002)  
NegOperRD 3.1359  0.0021  0.6530  -0.8434  -16.2080  -0.0002  0.6611  
 23.0085  1.0021  1.9214  0.4302  0.0000  0.9998   
 (0.2820)  (0.9990)  (0.6990)  (0.2470)  (0.9920)  (0.4790)   
FutOperRD 2.1606  0.5713*  -0.1189  -0.0566  -0.2059  -0.0001  0.2239  
 8.6762  1.7706  0.8879  0.9449  0.8139  0.9999   
 (0.0020)  (0.0510)  (0.7000)  (0.7620)  (0.4260)  (0.1060)   
TotFinRD 2.0548 0.1093 0.0432 -0.0380 0.0809 0.0000** 0.2281 
 7.8052 1.1155 1.0441 0.9627 1.0843 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.3050) (0.7107) (0.6248) (0.5052) (0.0480)  
NegFinRD -7.7927  -0.8287  -0.1035  1.7190**  -30.5915  0.0005**  0.0598  
 0.0004 0.4366 0.9017  5.5789  0.0000  1.0005   
 (0.0410)  (0.5710)  (0.9270)  (0.0370)  (1.0000)  (0.0220)   
FutFinRD -0.9315  0.8119***  0.1984  0.0621  0.1816  0.0001*  0.0112  
 0.3940  2.2522  1.2194  1.0641  1.1991  1.0001   
 (0.2140)  (0.0050)  (0.5550)  (0.7330)  (0.5600)  (0.0720)   
TotEnvRD 0.9564 0.4060** 0.2087 0.1289 0.1151 0.0000 0.1276 
 2.6023 1.5007 1.2320 1.1375 1.1220 1.0000  
 (0.0410) (0.0279) (0.2860) (0.3207) (0.5763) (0.6487)  
NegEnvRD 2.0775  0.2084  -0.0970  0.2569  -0.3660  -0.0001*  0.3292  
 7.9844  1.2317  0.9076  1.2929  0.6935  0.9999   
 (0.5261)  (0.6040)  (0.8230)  (0.2720)  (0.3930)  (0.0520)   
FutEnvRD 2.6848  0.6598  -0.1530  0.2450  -16.7636  -0.0002**  0.0165  
 14.6553  1.9344  0.8581  1.2776  0.0000  0.9998   
 (0.0610)  (0.1220)  (0.7500)  (0.5420)  (0.9910)  (0.0500)   
TotMgtRD 2.5374 0.3200*** 0.0250 -0.0048 0.2681** 0.0000 0.0022 
 12.6467 1.3772 1.0254 0.9952 1.3074 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.0029) (0.8295) (0.9504) (0.0154) (0.7263)  
NegMgtRD 1.6603  0.3995  -0.2174  0.0661  -0.7459*  -0.0001  0.2491  
 5.2607  1.4910  0.8046  1.0683  0.4743  1.0000   
 (0.0170)  (0.2420)  (0.5110)  (0.7340)  (0.0720)  (0.2560)   
FutMgtRD 2.8414  0.7981**  0.3797  0.0825  -0.5703  -0.0002***  0.0013  
 17.1397  2.2213  1.4618  1.0860  0.5654  0.9998   
 (0.0010)  (0.0240)  (0.2930)  (0.7020)  (0.1460)  (0.0000)   
TotPerfRD 2.4699 0.1282 0.1100 -0.0815 0.0116 0.0000 0.3115 
 11.8213 1.1368 1.1163 0.9218 1.0117 1.0000  
 (0.0000) (0.2670) (0.3803) (0.3277) (0.9285) (0.8714)  
NegPerfRDa n.a.        
FutPerfRD  1.5665  0.6813***  -0.3330  -0.0528  0.0941  0.0000  0.0249  
 4.7899  1.9765  0.7168  0.9486  1.0986  1.0000   
 (0.0030)  (0.0010)  (0.1200)  (0.7120)  (0.6720)  (0.5640)   
 
Notes to Table 5: power of e coefficient in normal font. 
 
e^coefficient in bold. As stated in Section 4.1, in a Poisson regression model 1 unit increase in the independent 
variable, given other variables are constant, means the estimated dependent variable increases by e^coefficient if the 
coefficient is positive; and decreases by e^coefficient times if the coefficient is negative. 
 
p-value in italics 
***, **, *denotes statistical significance at <0.01, <0.05, and <0.1 levels respectively 
a only 1 piece of negative risk performance information was coded from the selected companies in year 2009; the 
regression cannot be run as a result. 
 
1 This table provides the standard Poisson regression results for dependent variables TOTALRD, TotOperRD, 
TotFinRD, TotEnvRD, TotMgtRD, TotPerfRD, and the zero inflated Poisson regression results for the rest of the 
dependent variables (the type of risk disclosures). 
Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 9, Issue 3, 2013 
 
  77 
Table 5 reveals that firms with greater DedicInst investors do not exhibit significantly different risk 
disclosures, apart from one positive relationship between DedicInst and the extent of negatively-oriented 
financial risk disclosure (NegFinRD). This one significant relationship could be confounded by the fact 
that much of the disclosure of NegFinRD is due to external auditors imposing it to comply with AASB 7. 
Overall, therefore, the finding is that DedicInst shareholders are not pressuring company management to 
publicly disclose risk information. This result gives support to the arguments by Solomon et al. (2000) 
that institutional managers rely less on publicly available information on risk disclosure in company 
reports if that institution has a large holding of that company in its portfolio and has a longer investment 
horizon. Their strategy is to seek more timely information on the investee’s risk management and 
performance through private channels to management. So the results support Solomon et al.’s (2000) 
view that DedicInst shareholders are fairly neutral about annual report disclosures of risk information. On 
the other hand, Abraham and Cox (2007) contend that DedicInst shareholders, who have ample resources 
and capabilities to access private risk information, would not want this private information disclosed to 
competitor investors. Such public disclosure would be costly to the DedicInst investment manager under 
the proprietary cost hypothesis (Verrecchia, 1983). 
 
The hypothesis H1A concerning a negative relationship between DedicInst and risk disclosure is based on 
the proprietary cost argument. It is not supported by the result in Table 5. Instead the results support 
Solomon et al.’s (2000) argument that DedicInst shareholders have a moderate or relatively neutral view 
on risk disclosure in annual reports. 
 
Table 5 further reveals that when firms have greater TransInst investors there is a significant positive 
effect across most risk disclosure categories. As seen in the TransInst column in Table 5, there is a 
significant relationship with TOTALRD, TotalOperRD, TotMgtRD and NegMgtRD. With a higher 
proportion of TransInst shareholding, an investee company is expected to be encouraged to provide a 
higher extent of risk information disclosure because a TransInst effectively represents a highly diversified 
share ownership to the investee company, but with single professional-management of the TransInst 
representing a prospectively powerful principal. The agency theory argument is that agency costs would 
be higher in firms with more dispersed share ownership because of greater separation of ownership and 
control (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, for a large TransInst shareholder, management would have a 
sense of resource dependency which would encourage higher corporate transparency to appease the 
TransInst.  
 
The hypothesis H1B concerning a positive relationship between TransInst and risk disclosure is based on 
this argument of the separation but power of the principal to monitor the presence of adverse selection by 
the agent. It is supported by the result in Table 5. Interestingly, the categories of risk disclosure that are 
likely to be most relevant to TransInst investment managers, namely, future-oriented risk and negative 
risk performance disclosures, are not significantly related to TransInst in Table 5. This implies that 
company management responds to the presence of TransInsts by providing greater quantity, as distinct 
from quality, of risk information in the annual report. 
 
An audit committee is considered a pre-eminent governance mechanism in the corporate reporting 
process. The findings in this study about the effect of a more competent audit committee are shown in the 
ACIndep and ACFinExp columns of Table 5. First, there are significant positive relationships between 
ACIndep and the risk disclosure categories of TOTALRD, TotOperRD, TotEnvRD, FutOperRD, 
FutFinRD, TotMgtRD and FutMgtRD. This is an impressive range of influences on risk disclosures of an 
Audit Committee that has a higher independence ratio of members. The agency theory argument is that 
the greater the independence of the audit committee from top management, the more it is likely to 
advocate the interests of the company’s shareholders in terms of reducing information asymmetry.  
 
The hypothesis H2A concerning a positive relationship between ACIndep and risk disclosure is strongly 
supported by the result in Table 5. Importantly, the results reveal the effect of producing significantly 
higher future-oriented information about operating risk, financial risk and risk management risk. It is 
concluded that more independent audit committee is able to increase the amount of risk information 
disclosed in the areas of total and future risk information. This result is consistent with previous studies 
(Xie et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Hoitash et al., 2009). 
 
Turning to the results in Table 5 concerning ACFinExp, there is not one significant relationship to a risk 
disclosure category. Clearly H2B concerning a positive relationship between ACFinExp and risk 
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disclosure is rejected by the result in Table 5. It is evident that substantial financial qualifications or 
experience is not a pre-requisite for a member of an Audit Committee to have enough competence to 
influence the Board and management to produce greater transparency on risk in the annual report. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
While this study initially seeks to measure the quantity in term of number of sentences of risk information 
disclosed in annual reports, by content analyzing risk disclosures in sub-categories of risk performance, 
future-oriented risk information and negative risk information, the study has been able to shed more light 
upon the quality of risk disclosure in terms of its decision-relevance to users. This study focuses on 
institutional ownership and the presence of a competent audit committee to explain the pressures on 
management to make voluntary corporate risk disclosures in various decision-relevant categories of 
disclosure.  
 
In contrast to Abraham and Cox’s (2007) finding that risk disclosures are negatively but weakly relate to 
long-term institutional ownership, this study has found almost no relationship between DedicInst 
ownership and risk disclosure categories. This finding is consistent with the proprietary cost perspective 
of DedicInsts invoked by Bushee and Noe (2000). By comparison, in line with studies done by Bushee 
and Noe (2000) and Abraham and Cox (2007), a positive relationship is found between TransInst 
ownership and several risk categories, but not those that have higher decision-relevance for investors.  
 
In respect of the effect of audit committee independence on risk disclosures, in line with previous studies 
(McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Beasley, 1996; Abbott and Parker, 2000; Magena and Tauringana, 
2007), significant positive relationships are found with several risk disclosure categories, including total 
risk, total operating risk, total risk management, future operating risk, future financial risk and future risk 
management information. Such results support the agency monitoring quality argument. However, 
financial expertise of Audit Committee members is found to have no impact on the extent of risk 
disclosure. 
 
Finally, limitations in this study are outlined, together with suggestions for further research. First, the 
measures of risk reporting are limited to quantification of sentence counts of narrative in company annual 
reports. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, 2008) argue that quantity of disclosure alone cannot determine the 
effectiveness of risk disclosure. However, the quality of risk disclosures was studied via specific 
categorizations which enabled inferences to be made about the extent of decision-usefulness of the types 
of risk information disclosed. Further studies are necessary to more directly test the quality of risk 
disclosure. Either a subjective quality weighting, established by a panel of experts, could be applied to 
future content analysis of risk disclosures, or a survey of risk information users could be the basis for 
future studies. Second, using content analysis to aggregate the amount of risk disclosure is subjective 
regardless of methodological rigor. Unerman’s (2000) study shows that the reliability may also be 
adversely affected if a content analysis study employs a coding instrument which only takes account of 
words and numbers. To mitigate this problem, a reliable coding method is essential for drawing reliable 
conclusions in further studies in this field. A third limitation is classification of institutional ownership 
type. Due to the lack of institutional investors’ data, only the top 20 shareholders (excluding individual 
shareholdings) of a firm in the annual reports are examined. Furthermore, the current study adopts yearly 
data because of lacking corresponding quarterly data. For higher accuracy, future study could find all 
institutional investors’ shareholding data, as well as employing quarterly or even monthly data. Fourth, 
this study is only a one-year cross sectional study, and the year used of data selection may not reflect 
typical economic or financial conditions since it was a year in which capital markets were affected by the 
global financial crisis. Given these limitations, this study provides findings of interest to corporate 
regulators, institutional investors and company audit committees in Australia. While other studies on risk 
disclosure in Australia are also available, they are predominantly focused upon financial risks alone. Key 
players to be supported as drivers of a broad-based approach to corporate reporting in Australia are 
uncovered by this study.  
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